

Experimenting with Identity: Islam, Nationalism and Ethnicity

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Abstract

This paper presents the results of experiments that test the effects of religious and national identities on behavior across ethnic lines. In the study, 360 subjects in two Indonesian provinces were subtly and randomly exposed to visual cues for nationalism, Islam or a neutral control and then completed behavioral-economic tasks with monetary payoffs. I find that priming for Islam strongly raised generosity among Muslim subjects, reflecting Islamic norms of selflessness and sharing. Priming for national identity, while raising generosity, elicited ethnic *differentiation* rather than the ethnic cohesion often touted in nationalist rhetoric. I argue that the results reveal different ethnic status-hierarchies embedded in the two identity frameworks: groups that are underprivileged in the national setting are strongly favored in an Islamic one.

Introduction

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika “Unity in Diversity¹” (Old Javanese)
Motto on the Indonesian national coat of arms

Down with the New Madjapahitism²!

Pamphlet (1960) denouncing Indonesian nationalism as Javanese imperialism

And hold fast all together by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you) and be not divided among yourselves The Qur’an (3:103)(Ali 2004, 37)

How do religious and national identities condition behavior across ethnic lines? Religious resurgence worldwide is often viewed as a threat to international and domestic peace, raising concerns of religious strife. Less attention is given to its effects within the populations of co-religionists, themselves often ethnically diverse. Often in opposition to secular-nationalist regimes, religious movements seem to threaten a central goal of nationalism: the creation of “Unity in Diversity” in fractured populations. In this study I test how priming for competing Islamic and national identities affects social cohesion and ethnic stratification in Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population.

I argue a) that heightened Islamic identity can enhance norms of generosity and sharing, and b) that changing the salient identity from nationalism to Islam can effectively alter status hierarchies among ethnic groups.

Testing the effects of identity on behavior requires overcoming severe empirical challenges: common survey measures of identity are prone to “cheap talk”; unobserved factors (e.g. socioeconomic status) may affect both political identities and ethnic relations, resulting in spurious relationships between them; and politi-

¹Literally: “Of many parts, yet one”. Note also the U.S. *E Pluribus Unum* (Latin: “Of Many One”), the E.U. *Unity in Diversity* and the South African *!ke e:\xarra\ke* (\Xam Khoisan: “Diverse People Unite!”) among many similar examples.

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²Madjapahit (also spelled Majapahit) was a 13-16th century empire based in east Java.

cal identity is likely also the result—and not just the cause—of social interactions, making identification of causality particularly difficult. In this paper I present the results of experiments designed to overcome these challenges, using a novel methodological approach in comparative politics.

In the study, 360 subjects of diverse ethnicities and religions were recruited from among students at Islamic and secular universities in two Indonesian provinces, where different ethnic groups reside. Subjects were randomly and subtly exposed to the Indonesian national flag, a green flag of Islam, or a neutral control, thereby varying the cognitive salience of these identities in subjects' minds. Participants then engaged in tasks with monetary payoffs, interacting with other participants of diverse backgrounds.

This research design allows me to test two aspects of ethnic relations in particular: unconditional generosity and relative status relations among groups. Results from the Anonymous Dictator game³ provide direct evidence of generosity as it varies by the ethnicity of participants and by the identity treatment to which they were exposed. I rely on insights from System Justification Theory (Jost, Banaji & Nosek 2004, Jost & Hunyady 2002, Jost & Hunyady 2005) that differentiates in-group and out-group preferences of dominant and lower-status groups to test the ethnic status hierarchies embedded in the national and Islamic identity frameworks.

I find that priming for national and Islamic identity strongly raised peoples' generosity, suggesting that national and especially Islamic identities are associated with heightened norms of sharing. However, this generosity was conditioned by the ethnicity of Recipients⁴. Exposure to the nationalist treatment brought about strong ethnic *differentiation* rather than the ethnic unity often touted in nationalist rhetoric. In particular, members of minority ethnicities exhibited less generosity toward the dominant group when exposed to the national prime. The results contrast with the behavior of subjects in the Islamic treatment. Here, all participants—of dominant or minority ethnicities—exhibited significantly greater generosity toward members of ethnic minorities, often perceived in Indonesia as “more Muslim”.

I argue that these results reflect different status hierarchies embedded in national and Islamic frameworks. In a national context, where the plurality ethnicity dominates, minority members appeared to react to an ethnic hierarchy that is neither legitimized by Indonesian national ideals nor perceived as just by most Indonesians. The Islamic treatment, on the other hand, elicited discrimination in favor of minorities, inducing *out*-group favoritism from the dominant ethnicity that is typical of *lower* status groups. Islamic identity, in other words, effectively shifted the status advantage from the nationally dominant ethnicity to the minority.

³The Dictator game is a simple behavioral economic task in which subjects (Allocators) are asked to divide a sum of money between themselves and a second participant (a Recipient), as they see fit (Camerer 2003, Forsythe et al. 1994, Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1986). In its anonymous and non-repeated form, the task involves no strategy and offers a measure of altruistic behavior, as it varies across experimental conditions.

⁴Generosity similarly varied by the religion of the Recipients. These results and their political context will be detailed separately.

Context

This study follows work on the relationship between religious and ethnic identities (Laitin 1986) that identified limits to religious appeals in the ethnicized environment of the Nigerian Yoruba; the current study explores these limits further by simultaneously addressing religious and nationalist identity politics in another diverse society. The study joins recent research on the unifying, cohesive effect of Islamic experience (Clingsmith, Khwaja & Kremer 2008), using different methods. In exploring the normative effects of Islamic identity, the study follows research on the role of religion in regulating social behavior (Iannaccone 1992, Iannaccone 1994, Sosis & Ruffle 2003), including studies of priming for religion in laboratory experiments (Mazar, Amir & Ariely 2008, Shariff & Norenzayan 2007), and on the efficacy of Islamic politics in combatting corruption (Henderson & Kuncoro 2006).

This research also contributes to the literature on identity formation, offering empirical grounding for some of the debates in the macro-historical literature on nationalism [e.g. (Anderson 1991, Deutsch 1966, Gellner 1983, Mill 1958 [1861], Renan 1996 [1882])]. As with previous work on the micro-foundations of political identity, it emphasizes the role of social status (Laitin 1998), providing evidence for the contingency of status relations. In using experimental priming methods with national symbols it follows work in social psychology [(Hassin et al. 2007), for a review, see (Butz 2009)], but ties this to religious and ethnic identities in a political context.

Finally, the study directly builds upon the burgeoning experimental work on the effects of ethnic differences for interpersonal cooperation (Fershtman & Gneezy 2001, Gil-White 2004, Habyarimana et al. 2009, Habyarimana et al. 2007, Whitt & Wilson 2007)⁵, commonly viewed as a determinant of lower economic growth and lower public goods provision in heterogeneous societies (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly 1999, Easterly & Levine 1997, Okten & Osili 2004, Miguel & Gugerty 2005). It extends this experimental work in the context of the political shaping of identity, tying the work on ethnicity to the constructivist literature on identity (Bates 1973, Chandra 2004, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983, Laitin 1986, Laitin 1998, Posner 2005, Wilkinson 2004)]. It introduces the overtly political element using priming techniques, used in survey experiments on identity [e.g. (Transue 2007, Kuo & Margalit 2009)] and widely applied in other areas of political science.

Research was conducted in a particularly apt yet understudied case, Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world and home to the largest Muslim population. A central tenet of Indonesian nationalism is unity amidst the remarkable ethnic diversity of the archipelago. Islamic political action—especially since democratization in 1998—has produced concerns about relations across religious lines in Indonesia; far less attention is given to the importance of Islamic politics for inter-ethnic relations among Muslims.

The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section I detail the theory and its observable implications. I then briefly describe the Indonesian setting and research

⁵This study benefited greatly from the experience of Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein in Uganda. I thank them, and Jeremy Weinstein in particular.

sites. The empirical strategy, experimental procedures and the results of the study are then detailed. I then discuss this results in light of the theory and conclude.

Theory and Observable Implications

How would one expect national and Islamic identities to condition behavior across ethnic lines?

Most directly, we may expect priming for Islam to strengthen norms of sharing and generosity. Islamic parties frequently present themselves as the voices of piety, moral cleanliness, and selflessness⁶. Corruption, rampant in Indonesia, is a frequent target of Islamic party campaigns (Henderson & Kuncoro 2006)⁷ and Islamic movements worldwide propose Islam as the answer to the perceived individualism, selfishness and materialism of Western society and its offshoots (Buruma & Margalit 2004, 54). In the eyes of many Muslims, Islamic identity entails strong norms of selflessness and ethical behavior.

But priming for identity may also have more indirect effects. In particular, priming for identity would be expected to delimit identity categories (national or religious). Common group identity can be a strong force for social cohesion, as demonstrated in a large literature in social identity theory and self-categorization (Tajfel 1981, Turner 1985, Tajfel & Turner 1986)⁸. Shared ethnic identity, in particular, has been studied as a facilitator of cooperation and generosity (Whitt & Wilson 2007, Habyarimana et al. 2007, Habyarimana et al. 2009). An extension of the same logic applies to national identity. A central theme of nationalist rhetoric, in most countries, is national unity. Nation-building institutions have been studied as agents of cohesion across ethnic divides (Miguel 2004) and priming for national identity have been shown to elicit national unity (Transue 2007, Butz 2009)⁹. This line of reasoning is based on people's well-documented preference for members of their own identity category, whether as a means for affirming positive perceptions of the self, or as a strategic-evolutionary device for enhancing social capital.

Yet nationalism may act not only as an agent of cohesion. Nationalism also carries the potential for exclusion of some groups (Horowitz 1994, Bertrand 2004) and even among groups included in the national framework, patterns of differential

⁶For example, at the core of Islamic ethics is the value of generosity, evident in the fundamental duty of alms-giving (*Zakat*). For a discussion, see (Kuran 2003).

⁷Henderson and Kuncoro (2006) in fact find evidence that Islamic local government may indeed lower levels of corruption.

⁸Work in the minimal group paradigm (Brewer 1979, Tajfel & Flament 1971), in particular, demonstrates the potency of even arbitrarily manufactured identity categories in fostering positive attitudes toward (arbitrarily designated) in-group members.

⁹Transue (2007), for example, studied national *recategorization*, based on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio 2000), testing whether “*when members of an outgroup are recategorized into a shared superordinate identity, affect and attitudes toward [them]... become more positive.*” (Transue 2007, 81).

status and dominance may be enhanced by national institutions (Hechter 1975). Studies have demonstrated, accordingly, that national symbols may in fact trigger *disunity* when the nation is associated with highly uneven ascriptive status (Devos & Banaji 2005).¹⁰

Religious challenges to nationalism and Indonesian Islamic politics in particular emphasize alternative visions of society. Whereas nationalism may institutionalize ethnic hierarchies (inadvertently or by design), a shift of the salient identity dimension, I argue, can alter these status relations. Reliance on a broad and ethnically-inclusive religious platform, culturally appealing for reasons of faith as well, can effectively counter the power structure of the national arena and elevate the status of different groups. Indonesian society offers an excellent example of this; the nationally dominant Javanese are also considered “less Muslim” in the eyes of some Indonesians and therefore of lower standing through an Islamic lens.

How might status relations affect experimental results? Previous studies suggest that status can strongly affect market behavior in the laboratory (Ball et al. 2001), where subjects of higher status consistently earned more than lower-status subjects, even when status was randomly generated. From a theoretical standpoint, System Justification Theory (Jost, Banaji & Nosek 2004, Jost & Hunyady 2002, Jost & Hunyady 2005) suggests that people have a tendency to reaffirm the social system in which they operate and to internalize and even justify their position in society (including inferior positions). The theory predict counter-intuitive patterns of favoritism: “[a]s the perceived legitimacy of the system increases, (a) members of high-status groups will exhibit increased ingroup favouritism, and (b) members of low status groups will exhibit increased outgroup favouritism.” (Jost & Hunyady 2002, 121). In other words, people’s responses to the status hierarchies depend on a) perceptions of the status relationship in a given identity framework, and b) the legitimacy of this power relationship in the eyes of individuals¹¹.

This leads to several possible results. To the degree that the Indonesian national system is seen as egalitarian by Allocators, exposure to the national prime should elicit equal treatment of Recipients of all ethnicities. If the national order is viewed as unequal, however, we would expect one of two outcomes: if Allocators perceive this inequality as legitimate, lower status Allocators would display outgroup favoritism, while high-status Allocators would display in-group favoritism. On the other hand, those who do not view national status hierarchies as legitimate (even if they do feel attached to Indonesian nationalism, and perhaps even because of attachment to its pan-ethnic ideals) may react unfavorably to the status differences and “punish” the higher status group. As a result, nationalism would evoke greater ethnic differentiation rather than pan-ethnic unity.

Islamic identity would be expected to elicit an alternative status relationship. Here, to the degree that higher status is accorded to the ethnic minority, we would

¹⁰Gellner, in his highly influential view of nationalism as the political structure that enables social mobility in industrialized societies, identified ascriptive status differentiation along ethnic lines as perhaps the a central threat to national cohesion (Gellner 1981).

¹¹This legitimacy itself can be enhanced by the desire to reaffirm the status quo.

expect minority members to exhibit in-group favoritism and the ethnic plurality Javanese to exhibit out-group favoritism, conditional on the legitimacy of the status hierarchy in the eyes of subjects.

In sum, the moral content of the identity frameworks, the perceived power structures inherent in them, and their legitimacy in the eyes of subjects, produce the following expectations:

1. *Islamic Ethics*: To the degree that Islamic norms of selflessness are efficacious, we would expect exposure to the Islamic prime to evoke higher generosity among Muslims.
2. *National Unity*: Subjects who accept national ideals of pan-ethnic unity, and who perceive the national arena to be egalitarian, are expected to display equal generosity toward Recipients of all ethnicities.
3. *National Hierarchy*:
 - (a) *Justification of National Hierarchy*: If national identity is perceived to entail legitimate ethnic stratification, members of the ethnically-dominant Javanese should display *in-group* favoritism, while ethnic minorities should display *out-group* favoritism.
 - (b) *Reaction to National Hierarchy*: If national identity is perceived to entail *illegitimate* ethnic stratification, Allocators are expected to counter this hierarchy and display *pro-minority* favoritism.
4. *Islamic Reverse-Hierarchy*:
 - (a) *Justification of Islamic Hierarchy*: If Islamic identity is perceived to entail legitimate ethnic stratification, members of the ethnically-dominant (but religiously “inferior”) Javanese should display *out-group* favoritism, while members of ethnic minorities should display *in-group* favoritism.
 - (b) *Reaction to Islamic Hierarchy*: If Islamic identity is perceived to entail *illegitimate* ethnic stratification, Allocators are expected to counter this hierarchy and display *pro-Javanese* favoritism.

The Indonesian Setting and Research Sites

Indonesia offers an excellent setting for a study of national and Islamic identity projects overlaid on an ethnic substratum. Famously diverse and spread over a vast archipelago, Indonesia is home to some 240 million people, about 40% of whom belong to the dominant ethnic group, the Javanese¹², some 86% are Muslim¹³

¹²The second largest group, the Sundanese, comprise only about 15% of the population. Indonesia’s ethnic fractionalization Herfindahl score is nearly 0.77 (Fearon 2003). A simple indicator of Javanese dominance is the fact that all Indonesian presidents have been Javanese, with one brief exception.

¹³CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

and many ethnic groups (including the Javanese) include both Muslim and non-Muslims.

Indonesia has seen a long political and ideological competition between an array of Islamic (green) and nationalist (red-and-white) parties¹⁴. Indonesian nationalism is a classic case of attempts to forge unity in a diverse and disperse population (Elson 2008, Emmerson 2005) and was a prime example for Benedict Anderson in writing on “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991).

Indonesian political Islam is also highly diverse, reflecting the variety in Muslim history and practices. One relevant distinction is between strict adherents to the Islamic practice and those who professed Islam yet incorporate strong ritual and beliefs from Hinduism, Buddhism and local spiritual traditions (Geertz 1960)¹⁵. These distinctions among Muslim cut across ethnicities but are often associated with the Javanese in particular¹⁶. In fact, local spiritual beliefs are commonly referred to as *kejawen* (Javanist) (Geertz 1960; Hefner 2000) and a common stereotype of Javanese is that they are “superstitious” (Jaspars and Warnaen 1982), or simply “less Muslim”.

Research Sites

Two cities were selected for the study, Yogyakarta (in central Java) and Padang, in West Sumatra, the main centers of their respective provinces and prominent cities in Indonesia. The cities were selected so as to sample members of different ethnicities, each in their home province, interacting across sites.

Yogyakarta is an important center of Javanese culture and tradition, but was also the site of nationalist activity against the colonizing Dutch and a leading center of Islamic organization. West Sumatra is home to the Minangkabau (Minang) ethnicity, well known for their business acumen and for their strong traditions. The Minang are homogeneously Muslim and tend to be proudly pious. While culturally very distinct from the Javanese, and clearly not of a similar dominant position nationally, the Minang are not a marginalized group; West Sumatra, for example, was the birthplace of the first Indonesian vice president, prime minister and Islamic party leader, as well as important Muslim intellectuals (Federspiel 2006). Given its prominent nationalist (and Islamic) role, West Sumatra thus provides a “hard” test of nationally underprivileged status.

The two sites thus capture the different identity dimensions under study. Both are prominent centers of distinct ethnic traditions, both were instrumental in the development of political Islam, and both feature strongly in national history.

¹⁴Until 1965, a strong communist bloc was the third pole of Indonesian politics.

¹⁵Geertz’s account has since been criticized [e.g. (Laffan 2003, 7-10)] and the reality has evolved considerably (Hefner 2000, 94-127), yet the basic variation in Islamic identification and practice persists.

¹⁶Geertz himself was working primarily in Java.

Empirical Strategy

The experiments were designed to overcome the challenges of testing effects of identities on individual behavior. Both tendencies to identify with certain political causes and habits of social interaction are likely correlated with a myriad of unobserved variables, hindering empirical identification with conventional methods. This is exacerbated by the complex processes that mediate between macro-level identity and micro-level behavior, the functional forms of which are unknown. Furthermore, even if a relationship were established, one might plausibly infer a causal arrow running from social interactions to ideational constructs rather than the other way around (following long materialist traditions in social science). Worse yet, reporting on affect toward different groups is particularly prone to “cheap talk” and to attempts to disguise prejudice, problems that plague many survey studies. Finally, the study of two competing identities within a single political environment requires an effective means of disentangling them, even though many people may identify with both national and religious identities simultaneously.

In the experiments identities are subtly primed—made more salient, cognitively—to randomly drawn members of a sample of subjects. The random assignment to treatment groups enables us to test the causal effect of the saliency of different identity concepts on subsequent individual behavior. With an experimental design we can determine the direction of causality (from psychological awareness of political content to patterns of social interaction) and, by randomly assigning the treatments in a large enough sample, we can assume an even distribution of other, often unobserved, characteristics, such as social background and political conviction. In this design, no functional form need be assumed when comparing the treatment and control groups, unlike in parametric models of estimation. Priming for different identities, furthermore, also enables a study of the independent effects of these identities, even among individuals who identify with both.

After subjects were primed, behavior was measured using standard tasks from behavioral economics. The measurements reported here are derived from the simple “Dictator” tasks (Camerer 2003, Forsythe et al. 1994, Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1986), in which a subject (Allocator) is asked to divide a sum of money with a partner (Recipient) as he or she sees fit. Recipients, who were given money in the Dictator task, were drawn from a pool of participants in a preliminary study, some of whose characteristics were augmented to fit the Indonesian population more closely. Randomly pairing Allocators and Recipients provides measurements of behavior within and across group boundaries, in the control and treatment groups. By insuring anonymity and explicitly avoiding pairing any two participants twice, the task becomes a measure of generosity, or costly altruistic behavior, toward these Recipients. This method allows one to avoid “cheap talk”, since transfers in the Dictator tasks involved real monetary costs. Though participants may still transfer sums due to shame (despite strict anonymity) or attempts at disguising true attitudes, variation in this behavior across subtly and randomly administered treatment groups is largely immune to these concerns.

The main instruments tying political identity to behavior are the subtle primes

themselves. Note that in this study [as in (Kuo & Margalit 2009, Transue 2007)] the aim of priming individuals is not to create nationalist or Islamic attachment, but rather to trigger existing attachment, produced by real-world processes. By priming for existing identities, subjects naturally vary in the degree to which they identify with them. Using minimalist and subtle primes, we allow subjects to maintain their “thick” interpretations of the identity concepts, without imposing additional restrictions on the perceived construct.

The Sample

In total, three hundred and sixty subjects were recruited at three universities, across two provinces. All subjects were recruited with the assistance of university administrators, in their regular classes, and sessions were conducted in regular classrooms. The experiments in all sites took place within the span of a month starting in mid-April 2008. Table 1 summarizes the experimental sample by demographic category and by university.

Sample by Demographic Category, University and Faculty

University	Total	Bung Hatta U.	Islamic U. of Indonesia			Gadjah Mada U.	
		W. Sumatra	Yogyakarta			Yogyakarta	
Demographic		Humanities	Econ.	Islam	Psych.	Humanities	Politics
Javanese Muslim	152	3	46	23	37	30	13
Javan. non-Muslim	8	0	0	0	0	4	4
Minang	92	64	19	3	2	2	2
Other Muslim	93	31	0	11	29	11	11
Other non-Muslim	14	6	0	0	0	3	5
Total	359	104	65	37	68	50	35

Table 1: Sample by demographic category, university and faculty. The analysis is restricted to Muslim Subjects and Recipients, excluding mixed-Javanese subjects.

Recruitment in Yogyakarta (Java) took place at two universities, Islamic and secular. One-hundred and seventy subjects were recruited at the Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII). UII is a private university, which, though not radical in any sense, emphasizes Islamic teaching alongside other disciplines, admits only Muslim students and requires that all students dress in accordance with Indonesian Islamic norms. Students were recruited at the departments of accounting (in the faculty of economics), psychology, Islamic law and Islamic business studies.

Eighty-five subjects were recruited at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta, a public, secular and prestigious school with a diverse student body. Though most students at UGM are Muslim (and some wear Islamic garb), many are of other religions as well. UGM students were recruited from the departments of anthropology, literature and international relations.

One-hundred and one subjects were recruited at the Universitas Bung Hatta (UBH) in Padang, West Sumatra. UBH, a private university, caters mostly to students of the Minangkabau ethnicity, and while it has no official Islamic affiliation, most students are Muslim. As indicated in Table 1 most subjects from UBH were of the Minangkabau ethnicity.

Procedure

Each subject participated in one session, lasting between one hour and a half and two hours. Sessions were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language. Though not the native language of either Javanese or Minangkabau, all university students are fluent in Bahasa Indonesia, in which all school and university instruction is held. Sessions were led exclusively by trained local research assistants, both male and female, one crew for each city. To avoid affecting subjects' behavior, the author (and only foreigner involved) remained outside the experimental room, though in hearing distance, to answer questions as they arose¹⁷.

After introducing the study, including its affiliation to local and foreign universities and its administration on "different islands in Indonesia", the staff obtained human subjects consent (one subject opted not to participate). The staff then detailed the instructions for the first segment of the study, a set of behavioral economic tasks included in a paper packet handed out to each subject (see below). After all subjects had completed this segment and a short recess, they were asked to complete a detailed questionnaire. Subjects were invited, at the initial introduction, to come and receive their gains a few days later, at a pre-specified time. As noted below, the vast majority of subjects did indeed claim their gains.

The Anonymous Dictator Task

Several behavioral-economic exercises were included in each packet, starting with the Dictator game analyzed here. In the Dictator game each subject (Allocator) was given a monetary endowment of 11,000 Indonesian Rupiah (about US\$1.2 at the time, or some US\$16 in purchasing power parity terms). Allocators were then simply asked to decide how much of this endowment they wish to keep for themselves and how much to transfer to a Recipient. The Dictator task, through its simplicity, is tailored to gauge altruistic behavior that may factor in more complex, strategic settings. This simplicity also makes it ideal for straightforward measurement of other-regarding preferences, as they vary conditioned on the identities of the Allocator and Recipient.

¹⁷During the first session (of 11), in which 13 subjects participated, the author was present in the room though did not actively participate in the proceedings. Results are robust to the exclusion of this session.

Recipients

The Dictator task was carried out four times, pairing Allocators with different Recipients in each round. Allocators were clearly informed (more than once) that they would never be paired twice with the same Recipient, making these one-shot games in which future decisions do not affect incentive for play. Similarly, they were not provided with feedback before the end of the experiment, thus limiting learning and multi-stage cooperation or establishment of norms. The instructions for each round were presented on a separate page that included a box with brief information about the Recipient for that round (see appendix). The information included the Recipient’s age, profession, gender, marital status, religion, year of study, faculty, program of study, family language (a euphemism for ethnicity), the number of their older siblings, and the number of their younger siblings (the two are denoted by two separate words in Bahasa Indonesia). Below the information box, Allocators were given a brief prompt and could then choose from an exhaustive list of possible divisions of the endowment.

All interactions in these experiments were strictly anonymous (names of Allocators and Recipients were never shared, and all Allocators were assured of this in advance).

Recipients and the order in which they appeared were randomized across 14 different versions of the experimental packet. As a result, each Allocator was randomly paired with a different set of Recipients. Table 2 describes the pool of partners from which the Recipients for the Dictator task were drawn.

Partner (Recipient) Pool by Demographic Category & Faculty					
	Econ.	Humanities	Psych.	Islam	Total
Demographic					
Javanese Muslim	7	11	5	4	27
Javan. non-Muslim	2	2	4		8
Minang	4	5	0	1	10
Other Muslim	4	8	5	3	20
Other non-Muslim	3	6	1		10
Total	20	32	15	8	75

Table 2: Partner pool. Partners served as Recipients in the Dictator task, randomly assigned to rounds of play, in 14 different versions of the experimental protocol. All Recipients names were withheld. Information regarding faculty, religion, gender and ethnicity of Recipients was augmented to reflect a more representative sample (see Appendix for an example of information listed about a Recipient).

Payment

Payment for Allocators' participation in the experiments was calculated for two rounds of play (out of the rounds of all tasks, including the Dictator task). Allocators knew in advance that two rounds would be chosen for payment but did not know which rounds these would be. They were informed of the rounds selected for payment a few days after participation, upon payment of rewards. Allocators thus had an incentive to play each round as if it was actually carried out for pay [for similar payment procedures see (Ashraf, Bohnet & Piankov 2006, Eckel & Wilson 2004, Holt & Laury 2002, Schulze & Frank 2003)]. The vast majority of subjects did indeed claim their gains a few days after completion of the experiments. Actual payments averaged 10,326Rp. (about \$1.1 or some \$15 in purchasing power terms, see above) and varied from 0 to 20,000.

The Primes

The primes consisted of visual cues incorporated in the cover pages of the packets and in title pages introducing each task, such as the Dictator task. A title page for the Dictator task read *Aktivitas Pembagian* ("Division Activity") followed by the title of the study as a whole. Below this was an Indonesian national red-and-white flag, a green flag of Islam, or a black-and-white rectangle of equal shape and size. In addition, each title page included a time-frame for the study; the control read "2007-2008", the nationalist prime "2008-RI63" (referring to "Republik Indonesia 63", the years of Indonesian independence), while the Islamic prime indicated the Islamic calendar years (since the *Hijra*) "H.1428-1429". Reduced versions of the three title pages of the Dictator game are shown in Figure 1.

Each Allocator was exposed to one type of prime. As the Dictator task appeared first in the packet, each Allocator was exposed to the prime twice before completing the task (once on the cover page of the packet and once on the title page of the Dictator task itself, within the packet). Primes were included in equal numbers in each packet version. This insured that any particular effects of Recipient sets (which differed between packet versions) were evenly distributed across priming treatments. The random distribution of actual packets to Allocators was done manually at the start of each session. Packets were placed, face down, in front of the Allocator (seated at least one seat away from each other) until the session began.

Subtlety of Primes

An important consideration in the design of the procedure was maintaining the subtlety of the primes, so that Allocators would not be aware of their assignment to treatment. During a pre-testing stage, Allocators were thoroughly debriefed using a procedure based on (Bargh & Chartrand 2000) and asked to guess the aim of the study. No Allocator, upon debriefing or elsewhere, mentioned priming for nationalism or Islam. This was partly because each Allocator received a different prime and because Allocators were seated at some distance one from the other, so



Figure 1: Priming treatments randomly administered in the control, nationalist, and Islamic treatments as title pages for the “Division Activity” (Dictator)

that they could not easily notice any differences between different packets. As far as one could tell, the Allocators were not aware of the treatments to which they were assigned, nor did they even notice that these treatment groups existed.

It was also important, though less so, that Allocators not recognize the special relevance of the information on the ethnicity of Recipients. Allocators in an advanced pre-test, who were thoroughly debriefed, did not single out ethnicity as the focus of the study. Note that even if some Allocators guessed the importance of ethnicity, this study is primarily concerned not with the main effects of demographics, but with the interaction of the subtle priming and the demographic characteristics. As long as Allocators cognizant of the importance of ethnicity were evenly distributed between the control and the treatment groups, the validity of the findings is maintained.

Results

In total, data from 359 Allocators are analyzed¹⁸ (not including participants in the pre-test). In the three treatment groups and across all dyads, 1,111 Dictator decisions were recorded. The analysis below is restricted, however, to interactions between Muslim Allocators and Recipients. Since the effect of an Islamic prime is qualitatively different for non-Muslim Allocators, their inclusion would dramatically confound interpretation of this treatment’s effect; data for the nationalist prime is similarly restricted for comparability. To isolate the effects of ethnicity, I hold

¹⁸Data from one additional Allocator was omitted for an error in administration of the treatments. Of the remaining 359 students, data from 4 was omitted for errors that rendered the data unusable.

religion constant, by including only within-religion interactions (for a remainder of 590 Dictator decisions).

Among Muslim-Muslim interactions, across all treatment groups, the mean Dictator transfer was 3,804Rp. (of 11,000, s.e. 2119.7) and the median was 4,000. 72% of Allocators opted to transfer more than 2,000 (18.2%) (dubbed here as a “generous” transfer) and 18% gave more than half (dubbed “super-generous”; note that the completely equitable transfer of 5,500Rp. was purposely unavailable).

Direct Effects of Primes on Behavior




Figure 2: Distribution of Dictator Transfers in control, Islamic and nationalist treatments. Transfers ranged from 0Rp. to 11,000Rp, in increments of 1,000Rp.

Patterns of generosity were strongly affected by the identity treatments. For both treatments, this was a positive and significant effect.

As can be seen in Figure 2 and Table 3, mean transfers rose from 3,433Rp. in the control to 4,033 in the Islamic treatment (statistically significant at the 5% level). The median similarly rose from (3,000Rp. to 4,000Rp.) as did the percentages of generous and super-generous transfers. In the nationalist treatment, Dictator transfers also rose from the mean of 3,433Rp. in the control to 3,901Rp. (significant at the 10% level), with similar effects for the median, generous and super-generous transfers.

Dictator Transfers By Treatment			
	Control	Islamic	Nationalist
mean	3,433	4,033	3,901
s.e.	(2,234)	(2,155)	(1,864)
median	3,000	4,000	4,000
generous (>2,000)	63%	79%	74%
super-generous (>5,000)	14%	24%	18%
N	141	122	121

Table 3: Dictator transfers by Muslim Allocators, excluding mixed-Javanese.

The Interaction of Identity Manipulation and Ethnicity

Though the direct effects of the primes are similar, the effects of the treatments were not even across ethnic groups. The pattern becomes clear when observing the effects of treatments on Allocators conditional on their ethnicity, as in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Mean Dictator transfers, of 11,000Rp. in the control, Islamic and nationalist treatments. Sample restricted to Muslim Allocators and Recipients.

First, note that in the control (the black bars) there is a baseline difference in generosity; on average non-Javanese transferred more than 800Rp. more than

Javanese (significant at the 5% level)¹⁹. Second, note that both types of Allocators gave more when exposed to the Islamic prime (see below for further analysis), while only the Javanese appear more generous due to exposure to the nationalist prime. This pattern suggests, as expected, that the effects of the primes are contingent on the ethnicity of Allocators. Below I analyze these ethnic effects for each treatment.

The Nationalist Treatment

Figure 4 and Table 4 show the pattern underlying the difference in effects the nationalist prime had on Javanese and non-Javanese. Javanese Allocators give some 40% more in the nationalist treatment than in the control, whether Recipients are Javanese or not (significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively).




Figure 4: Mean Dictator transfers in the control and nationalist treatment. Sample restricted to Muslim Allocators and Recipients, excluding mixed Javanese.

Interestingly, Javanese reveal no ethnic bias in the control (where they transferred, on average, 3,000Rp to Javanese and 3,029Rp. to non-Javanese) nor in the nationalist treatment. Non-Javanese Allocators, however, responded differently

¹⁹This is notable considering a common stereotype of Minangkabau, the main non-Javanese group in the sample, is “stinginess” (*pelit*). The stereotype is not supported by these data. On stereotypes and social distance among Indonesian ethnicities, see (Jaspars & Warnaen 1982)

to the nationalist treatment, where average transfers by non-Javanese to Javanese dropped compared to the control.

Given the different baseline generosity (in the control) between the two subsamples, I calculate the difference-in-difference in the effect of the nationalist prime on Javanese and non-Javanese. This allows one to control for the base-line difference that may be due to an array of unobserved variables that distinguish the two groups. The difference-in-difference provides a measure of the effects of the treatments *conditional* on the ethnicity of the Allocator. As shown in Table 4 and on the right hand side of Figure 4, average generosity by Javanese Allocators to co-ethnic Javanese Recipients rose by 1,256Rp. due to the nationalist treatment, while average generosity by non-Javanese to Javanese Recipients dropped by 833Rp. The difference between these effects is more than 2,000Rp. ($p = .003$).

To sum, the nationalist treatment strongly and significantly raised generosity by Javanese, the dominant ethnicity in the national arena, but had a different effect on non-Javanese Allocators. Non-Javanese showed no difference between control and nationalist treatment when interacting with other non-Javanese, but appeared to lower generosity toward the Javanese, especially when compared to the similar behavior by Javanese Allocators.

Dictator Transfers						
Allocators	Javanese Recipients			non-Javanese Recipients		
	control	nationalist	diff.	control	nationalist	diff.
Javanese	3,000 (1,803) 33	4,256 (1,382) 43	1,256*** (41.9%)	3,029 (2,125) 34	4,214 (1,853) 28	1,185** (39.1%)
non-Javanese	3,833 (2,613) 42	3,000 (2,154) 26	-833 ($p = .107$) (-21.7%)	3,781 (2,151) 32	3,875 (2,071) 24	94 (2.5%)
difference	-833 (-27.8%)	1,256** (29.5%)	2,089*** (diff-in-diff)	-752 (-24.8%)	339 (8%)	1,091 (diff-in-diff)

Table 4: Mean Dictator transfers of 11,000Rp., by Muslim Allocators with Muslim Recipients, excluding mixed-Javanese; s.e. in parentheses and number of observations. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%, using a two-tailed t-test with Satterthwaite's approximation for degrees of freedom.

The Islamic Treatment

The effects of the Islamic treatment display a different pattern to the nationalist one. As shown in Figure 3, both Javanese and non-Javanese Allocators transferred more, on average, in the Islamic treatment than in the control. As evident in Figure 5, the differences in the Islamic prime are not conditioned by the ethnicity of Allocators, but by the ethnicity of Recipients. While the Islamic treatment did not suppress generosity compared to the control, the Islamic treatment clearly favored non-Javanese Recipients much more than Javanese Recipients. As shown in Table 5, generosity toward Javanese was not strongly affected, while generosity toward non-Javanese Recipients rose for both Javanese and non-Javanese Allocators. The difference-in-difference estimates are not significant, reflecting the fact that the pattern—higher generosity, focused especially on non-Javanese Recipients—is true for all types of Allocators.




Figure 5: Mean Dictator transfers in the control and Islamic treatment. Sample restricted to Muslim Allocators and Recipients, excluding mixed Javanese.

Table 6 presents mean transfers by Recipient ethnicity and treatment. Here, average transfers to non-Javanese (in the second column) rose significantly (and by some 32%), while transfers to Javanese Recipients did not change significantly. Moreover, while in the control there was no notable difference in generosity toward the two sets of Recipients (the first row), a significant anti-Javanese bias emerged in the Islamic treatment. The dominant ethnicity in the national arena, in other

words, was systematically discriminated against in the Islamic treatment, with no discernible difference based on whether or not Allocators themselves were Javanese.

Dictator Transfers						
Allocators	Javanese Recipients			non-Javanese Recipients		
	control	Islamic	diff.	control	Islamic	diff.
Javanese	3,000 (1,803) 33	3,556 (1,972) 45	556 (18.5%)	3,029 (2,125) 34	4,158 (2,455) 19	1,129($p = .102$) (37.3%)
non-Javanese	3,833 (2,613) 42	3,966 (2,163) 29	133 (3.5%)	3,781 (2,151) 32	4,759 (2,116) 29	978* (25.9%)
difference	-833 (-27.8%)	-410 (-11.5%)	423 (diff-in-diff)	-752 (-24.8%)	-601 (-14.5%)	151 (diff-in-diff)

Table 5: Mean Dictator transfers of 11,000Rp., by Muslim Allocators with Muslim Recipients, excluding mixed-Javanese; s.e. in parentheses and number of observations. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%, using a two-tailed t-test with Satterthwaite's approximation for degrees of freedom.

Dictator Transfers			
Treatment	to Javanese	to non-Javanese	diff.
Control	3,467 (2,315) 75	3,394 (2,155) 66	-73 (-2.1%)
Islamic	3,716 (2,044) 74	4,521 (2,250) 48	805** (21.7%)
Difference	249 (7.2%)	1127*** (33.2%)	878 (diff-in-diff)

Table 6: Mean Dictator transfers of 11,000Rp., to Muslim Recipients, excluding mixed-Javanese; s.e. in parentheses and number of observations. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%, using a two-tailed t-test with Satterthwaite's approximation for degrees of freedom.

Robustness: Multivariate Analysis and the “Color Effect”

Random assignment to treatment and control may still, by chance, produce uneven distributions of confounding variables. To check for the robustness of the results, a set of multivariate models were estimated and are presented in the tables in the appendix.

Table 8 verifies the positive effect of the nationalist treatment on Dictator transfers by Javanese Allocators (the sample for these models was restricted accordingly). Model 1 presents the bivariate relationship, with an OLS model estimated with a dummy variable for the nationalist treatment (and the control, only, in the intercept). In models 2-3 regressors were added for characteristics of Allocators and Recipients (for the characteristics of Recipients visible to Allocators, see Figure 6), including dummy variables for Javanese or Minangkabau Recipients, a variable for the Allocator’s age, a dummy variable for Allocators who are single children, and a variable for students at the Islamic University of Indonesia.

Two measures of “social capital” were included: recent participation in “rotating credit” circles (*Arisan*), and answers to the question “Would most people take advantage of you or would they try to be fair?” (with two response options) [as in GSS surveys (Davis, Smith & Marsden 2007)]. Further controls include a dichotomous variable for “Traditionalist” vs. “Modernist” Muslim Allocators²⁰, coded using questions on prayer practice of the Allocators²¹, the age of the Recipient, their gender, their years of study at university, the number of older and younger siblings they have, a dummy variable denoting that the Allocator and Recipient are of the same faculty (to check for an in-faculty preference, and a dummy variable for Recipients of economics faculties (who may be construed as more wealthy by Allocators, as informal conversations suggested).

Models 4-6 include fixed effects. Model 4 includes fixed effects for each of the individual Recipients, absorbing any idiosyncratic additive effects of individual Recipients. Model 5 includes fixed effects for packet versions (that determine the order and identity of Recipients who appeared in each packet; as noted, 14 different versions were created and randomly distributed, across all treatment groups). Finally, model 6 includes fixed effects for rounds of play (each allocation may have occurred in any of the four rounds of play).

As can be seen in the table, the strong and robust effect of the nationalist prime withstands these different tests. Table 9, also in the appendix, similarly verifies the robustness of the interaction effect—the interaction of Javanese Allocators and the

²⁰ “Modernist” Islam in Indonesia emphasizes rationalism and a return to “pure”, universal forms of Islamic practice (Federspiel 2001, Laffan 2003) more in line with Middle Eastern Islam. “Traditionalist” Islamic organizations emerged in reaction and tend to stress local jurisprudence and traditions. Organizations of both types run vast networks of religious schools and boast dozens of millions of members each.

²¹ Subjects were asked how many *rakaat* (prayer cycles) they perform in nightly *Tawarikh* prayers during the holy month of Ramadan. (Traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia tend to perform 20 *rakaat*; Modernists tend to perform 8.) I am indebted to Fuad Jabali for generous advice and assistance with this measure.

nationalist treatment—in Dictator transfers to Javanese Recipients. As can be seen, this effect is similarly robust, suggesting that Javanese and non-Javanese are reacting differently to the nationalist prime vis-a-vis Javanese Recipients.

Finally, Table 10 tests the robustness of the “ethical” effect of the Islamic prime. Note that this analysis includes both Javanese and non-Javanese Muslim Recipients. As noted above, the effect was even stronger when directed toward non-Javanese alone.

Politics or Color?

A final robustness check relates not to the data analysis but to the validity of the primes themselves. Pre-experiment conversations with many Indonesians suggested the primes do trigger simple, minimal national and Islamic associations in Indonesians’ minds. A concern remained, however, regarding the control. Is it possible that having colorful primes but a black-and-white control caused people to respond differently? (Bright colors may appear more expensive, for example.) This seems unlikely given the different types of effects evoked by the two colorful primes, but to remove this concern a fourth, smaller, treatment group was included in the design. 29 Allocators (excluded from the analysis above) received a control packet with a colorful brown rectangle rather than the black-and-white control. As in the control, the years read “2007-2008”.

Table 7 reports a comparison of behavior in the control and brown treatments. While the sub-sample is small in the latter case, the results do not suggest any, even remotely significant differences between the two conditions.

Comparison of Control and Brown Prime			
	control	brown	diff.
Mean transfer	3,753	3,844	91
	(,2260)	(2,147)	(2.4%)
	235	64	

Table 7: Mean Dictator transfers of 11,000Rp., by Muslim Allocators with Muslim Recipients, in black-and-white control and in Brown priming condition. Differences between columns are not significant at conventional levels.

Discussion

The results provide direct evidence of the generosity-enhancing effects of subtle, random priming for political identity. They also point to the different status hierarchies embedded in Islamic and national identities.

Expectation 1, that of an ethical effect, is strongly confirmed by the data. Islamic priming elicited significantly higher generosity toward Muslims, as Islamic

norms of selflessness and generosity would suggest. This is notable in that all the tasks in this experiment were anonymous and included no group sanctioning or censure. Nonetheless, Allocators exhibited adherence to higher standards of generosity when primed for Islamic identity.

Perhaps surprisingly, the nationalist treatment also elicited an ethical effect among members of the plurality-ethnicity, suggesting that exposure to the national flag evoked a sense of national duty or solidarity toward other Indonesians. This is consistent with theories of nationalism that stress solidarity among members of the nation. According to J.S. Mill, for example, a nation requires “common sympathies” that make co-nationals “cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people.” (Mill 1958 [1861]); according to Anderson: “[The nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation[it] is always conceived as a deep, horizontal *comradeship*.” (Anderson 1991, 7, emphasis added).

The expectation that one would find national cohesion due to the nationalist priming (Expectation 2) is confirmed for Javanese Allocators. Javanese strongly raised generosity across ethnic lines and did not condition their generosity on the Recipients’ ethnicity. Note, however, that behavior in the control revealed no ethnic biases either: transfers did not differ by the ethnicity of Recipient for either type of Allocator. This echoes previous results in the Dictator game from Uganda (Habyarimana et al. 2009), where no ethnic “taste for discrimination” was found. The present study, however, went beyond the effects of ethnicity to test their interaction with identity priming.

Ironically, priming for national identity brought about ethnic *differentiation* by minority Allocators²², revealing a “taste for discrimination” under priming. Unlike the dominant Javanese, minority Allocators displayed no “national unity” in response to the nationalist prime; rather, they appeared to react to the ethnic hierarchies by lowering generosity toward the Javanese, in accordance with expectation 3(a). This pattern suggests that minorities recognize the national dominance of the Javanese and view it as illegitimate.

Secessionist causes in Indonesia provide extreme examples of this sentiment²³. Regional uprisings often used explicit anti-Javanese rhetoric; one pamphlet (cited in the preamble) accused national leaders of promoting a modern-day Javanese empire while “using the tragedy of foreign imperialism as their disguise and talking about national unity” (Feith & Castles 2007 [1970], 331). Similarly, the founder of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) claimed that “Indonesia was merely a front for Javanese dominance” (Aspinall 2009, 3) and rallied against “Javanese masquerading as ‘Indonesians’” [(Tiro 1984, 11), quoted in (Aspinall 2007, 961)]. Notable in

²²Whitt and Wilson (2007) found a small in-group bias among Bosnjak, Croat and Serb Subjects in highly ethnically-politicized Bosnia (in late 2003 and early 2004). In a sense, the national prime in the present study seems to have evoked a similar political awareness of ethnic differences, though the relations between Javanese and Minang by no means resemble recent hostilities in Bosnia.

²³Note that secessionism is not prevalent in West Sumatra, where ethnic differences are far more mild than in other parts of the archipelago.

these examples is not merely the opposition to Javanese power, but the sense that nationalism is used to camouflage ethnic hegemony.

The results for the nationalist prime contrast strongly with those in the Islamic treatment. Here, behavior was not conditioned by the ethnicity of the Allocators but by the ethnicity of Recipients. In the Islamic prime all groups—including Javanese—favored minority Recipients (most of whom are of “more Muslim” ethnicities). Members of the nationally-dominant ethnicity displayed, in other words, *out*-group favoritism, while minority Allocators displayed in-group favoritism. This pattern accords strongly with expectation 4(a) (and with the predictions of System Justification Theory); through an Islamic lens, minorities are viewed as having higher status, and this hierarchy is viewed as legitimate even by members of the nationally-dominant ethnicity. Unlike most previous examples of System Justification Theory, however, this provides evidence of a generally *dominant* group displaying behavior that is characteristic of *lower-status* groups, when primed for an alternative identity.

Taken together, these results show the potency of ethical effects associated with political identities, the real-world status relations embedded in these identities, and the manipulability of the identities through subtle priming.

Conclusion

This study tested the effects of Islamic and national identity on behavior in a diverse society, by subtly and randomly priming people for different aspects of their identity and then recording their decision in behavioral-economic tasks. The priming had significant and pronounced effects on costly behavior, offering evidence of the ease of identity manipulation in a contested ideological environment. Though the priming in this experiment was artificial, it echoes everyday practice of political entrepreneurs who highlight specific identities for political gain. Countless instances of social and political actors “playing the [race/religion/nationality] card” can be noted. The political significance of this practice is largely due to the relative ease with which it can be employed.

But the findings also point to some of the limits of identity manipulation. The political identities under study in this case are by no means arbitrary; contrary to a great deal of research in social psychology, national and Islamic identities connote “thick” political meanings in Indonesian culture. Accordingly, priming for these identities evoked real-world power structures and demographic realities. When priming was analyzed in interaction with ethnic identities, complex results emerged. National identity, it was shown, can bring about heightened universal generosity in some, but can also trigger ethnic discord among those who feel disadvantaged in the national arena. Analogously, though political entrepreneurs may have clear goals in mind when investing in identity manipulation (such as the promotion of unity by nationalist projects), the outcomes of this process may diverge considerably from their intended goals.

A further aspect of political identity manipulation emerged in this research:

the different status hierarchies embedded in alternative identities. Different status relations, the study indicates, may also be triggered by slight manipulation. This can be used by political elites seeking to gain support in a diverse society, where some groups will inevitably feel disadvantaged and may thus find alternative identity concepts more appealing.

The specific power relations among Indonesian ethnicities, and the stereotypes of one group as “less Muslim” than others, are idiosyncratic to Indonesia. Nonetheless, I believe the underlying patterns hold true in many other societies. The ease of identity manipulation, the role of ideational constructs in costly behavior and the status hierarchies embedded in different identities are all general findings that call for replication in other political environments.

Finally, the results suggest future avenues of research beyond the experimental study of identity. The use of ethnic grievances by religious elites is not unique to Indonesia, and it has strong implications at the macro-political level as well as the micro-level of individual interactions. To the degree that religion conditions ethnic relations and competes with other conceptions of social identity—such as nationalism—religious resurgence is likely to effect the ways in which ethnicity shapes political outcomes. In this regard, centrality of political religious resurgence to contemporary global politics calls for further research into the causes and consequences of religious identity activation.

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Appendix: Additional Figures & Tables

Round 1
[Partner information]

Serial number	16365
Age	19
Profession	Student
Status	Single
Gender	Female
Religion	Islam
Year of study	1
Faculty	Humanities
Program	Indonesian literature
Family language	Javanese
Older siblings	3
Younger siblings	0

How much of Rp. 11,000 are you transferring to the participant above?

(Please circle only one)

1. Transfer Rp. 0 (you receive Rp. 11,000)
2. Transfer Rp. 1,000 (you receive Rp. 10,000)
3. Transfer Rp. 2,000 (you receive Rp. 9,000)
4. Transfer Rp. 3,000 (you receive Rp. 8,000)
5. Transfer Rp. 4,000 (you receive Rp. 7,000)
6. Transfer Rp. 5,000 (you receive Rp. 6,000)
7. Transfer Rp. 6,000 (you receive Rp. 5,000)
8. Transfer Rp. 7,000 (you receive Rp. 4,000)
9. Transfer Rp. 8,000 (you receive Rp. 3,000)
10. Transfer Rp. 9,000 (you receive Rp. 2,000)
11. Transfer Rp. 10,000 (you receive Rp. 1,000)
12. Transfer Rp. 11,000 (you receive Rp. 0)

Figure 6: Example of instructions page for Dictator task (translated and scaled)

Dictator Transfers by Javanese Allocators						
	M1	M2	M3	FE4	FE5	FE6
Nationalist prime	1,225*** (384)	983** (390)	918** (410)	1,004*** (335)	1,063*** (373)	935*** (327)
Javanese Recip.		-204 (302)	1,013 (838)	1,436 (1,009)	-1,622 (1,692)	293 (1,128)
Minang Rec.			893 (1,051)		-2,873 (2,460)	-631 (1,404)
Allocator age		-420*** (117)	-394*** (129)	-376*** (114)	-507*** (151)	-367*** (114)
Single child		-72 (561)	274 (589)	269 (768)	-125 (860)	230 (805)
Islamic U.		280 (371)	445 (394)	454 (317)	33 (491)	548* (328)
Wealth		-205 (329)	-67 (326)	-157 (291)	-395 (351)	-132 (260)
Rotating credit		1,428*** (519)	1,201* (619)	1,120* (585)	1,049 (643)	1,138* (582)
Trust measure		373 (353)	294 (388)	313 (328)	191 (417)	267 (320)
Traditionalist		74 (449)	119 (434)	99 (351)	281 (313)	56 (342)
Recipient age			-430 (391)		364 (668)	201 (734)
Female Recip.			-247 (273)		1,356 (969)	-135 (467)
Rec. year in U.			483 (784)		-410 (1,782)	-1,092 (1,528)
R. older siblings			5 (308)		90 (1,090)	-1 (303)
R. young siblings			-47 (198)		1,035* (532)	87 (218)
Same faculty			291 (286)		411 (380)	329 (365)
R. Econ faculty			1,911* (982)		-1,151 (2,241)	495 (1,786)
intercept	3,015*** (304)	11,434*** (2,876)	17,606** (7,489)	9,398*** (2,710)	6,313 (12,555)	7,392 (12,584)
N	138	117	117	117	117	117

Table 8: OLS regression of Dictator transfers of 11,000Rp., by Javanese, Muslim Allocators to Muslim Recipients. Model 5 includes fixed effects for individual Recipients, model 6 includes f.e. for packet versions (that determine the identity and order of Recipients), models 7 includes f.e. for the four rounds of play in the Dictator task. In models 1-3 residuals are clustered per Allocator. Robust s.e. in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.

Dictator Transfers to Javanese Recipients						
	M1	M2	M3	FE4	FE5	FE6
Nationalist prime	-833 (635)	-611 (702)	-566 (675)	-396 (582)	-522 (568)	-607 (581)
Javanese Allocator	-833 (565)	-1,012* (583)	-844 (616)	-983* (525)	-1,108* (610)	-870 (596)
Nation.XJava Alloc.	2,089*** (757)	1,707** (832)	1,551* (818)	1,552** (699)	1,737** (731)	1,621** (731)
Allocator age		185 (152)	214 (168)	196 (157)	126 (165)	218 (180)
Single child		390 (515)	684 (538)	505 (627)	-76 (771)	581 (419)
Islamic U.		411 (399)	563 (382)	421 (375)	579 (457)	442 (394)
Wealth		372 (289)	394 (272)	259 (301)	133 (320)	386 (255)
Rotating credit		267 (614)	3 (666)	-30 (515)	-21 (494)	-12 (532)
Trust measure		333 (415)	211 (398)	239 (363)	282 (411)	130 (367)
Traditionalist		290 (451)	383 (468)	474 (441)	563 (518)	472 (453)
Recipient age			-145 (204)		-129 (390)	-110 (287)
Female Recip.			-437 (331)		-1,029* (610)	-1,052* (577)
R. older siblings			-98 (292)		275 (649)	-249 (302)
R. young siblings			164 (199)		-20 (333)	-144 (286)
Same faculty			533 (428)		797* (452)	496 (463)
intercept	3,833*** (442)	-1,796 (3,112)	971 (6,752)	-1,096 (3,456)	3,931 (10,503)	1,621 (8,225)
N	144	118	118	118	118	118

Table 9: OLS regression of Dictator transfers of 11,000Rp., to Muslim Javanese Recipients by Muslim Allocators. Model 4 includes fixed effects for individual Recipients, model 5 includes f.e. for packet versions (that determine the identity and order of Recipients), models 6 includes f.e. for the four rounds of play in the Dictator task. In models 1-3 residuals are clustered per Allocator. Robust s.e. in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.

Dictator Transfers in Control and Islamic Treatment						
	M1	M2	M3	FE4	FE5	FE6
Islamic prime	622*	656*	580	629**	690**	556*
	(315)	(340)	(401)	(311)	(317)	(305)
Javanese Allocator		-702**	-730*	-678**	-656**	-673**
		(341)	(384)	(309)	(314)	(306)
Javanese Recip.		-286	422	-849	-270	925
		(262)	(785)	(903)	(1,709)	(1,287)
Allocator age			87	87	56	64
			(115)	(124)	(114)	(123)
Single child			664	557	342	526
			(627)	(780)	(901)	(774)
Islamic U.			480	420	331	491
			(416)	(348)	(360)	(341)
Wealth			-97	-108	-92	-106
			(371)	(281)	(271)	(270)
Rotating credit			40	53	126	31
			(641)	(475)	(498)	(490)
Trust measure			797*	711**	609*	799**
			(424)	(342)	(340)	(336)
Traditionalist			221	258	399	280
			(525)	(405)	(420)	(418)
Recipient age			-298		38	-827
			(372)		(709)	(854)
Female Recip.			-38		303	340
			(344)		(995)	(572)
Rec. year in U.			198		186	1,118
			(791)		(1,715)	(1,823)
R. older siblings			57		605	35
			(316)		(969)	(307)
R. young siblings			63		267	79
			(218)		(575)	(273)
Same faculty			-37		-22	-9
			(343)		(386)	(376)
R. Econ faculty			1,397		568	2,169
			(998)		(2,213)	(1,969)
intercept	3,566***	3,919***	5,904	850	809	14,345
	(217)	(320)	(6,822)	(2,703)	(12,675)	(14,613)
N	324	263	204	204	204	204

Table 10: OLS regression of Dictator transfers of 11,000Rp., in the control and the Islamic treatment, by Muslim Allocators with Muslim Recipients. Model 4 includes fixed effects for individual Recipients, model 5 includes f.e. for packet versions (that determine the identity and order of Recipients), models 6 includes f.e. for the four rounds of play in the Dictator task. In models 1-3 residuals are clustered per Allocator. Robust s.e. in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.