The collapse of political regimes – both democratic and autocratic – is often brought about through large-scale mobilization and collective action by (elements of) the populace against its leadership. The willingness of any given member of the public to participate in such actions against her leaders is contingent upon her beliefs about others’ willingness to similarly mobilize. In this paper, we examine the role of the disclosure of economic data by the government to the populace on citizen belief formation, and consequently on collective mobilization. We present a theoretical model in which disclosure, under autocratic rule, (1) increases the extent to which mobilization is correlated with incumbent performance, and (2) for a range of parameter values, increases the frequency of mobilization. In democracies, by contrast, disclosure increases voter discrimination with respect to government performance. Because voting and mobilization act as substitute mechanisms in disciplining the government, the risk of mobilization falls in transparency. We empirically test these claims and find that all enjoy robust support. Transparency destabilizes autocracies even as it stabilizes democracies.