Past Events

March 8, 2013

One of the most striking findings in political science is the democratic peace: the absence of war between democracies. Some authors have attempted to explain this phenomenon by highlighting the role of public opinion. They observe that democratic leaders are beholden to voters, and argue that voters oppose war because of its human and financial costs. This logic predicts that democracies should behave peacefully in general, but history shows that democracies avoid war primarily in their relations with other democracies. In this article we investigate not whether democratic publics are averse to war in general, but instead whether they are especially reluctant to fight other democracies. We embedded experiments in public opinion polls in the U.S. and the U.K., and found that individuals are substantially less supportive of military strikes against democracies than against otherwise identical autocracies. Moreover, our experiments suggest that shared democracy pacifies the public primarily by changing perceptions of threat and morality, not by raising expectations of costs or failure. These findings shed light on a debate of enduring importance to scholars and policymakers.

March 6, 2013

Kevin Quinn is Professor of Law at the UC Berkeley School of Law. Prior to joining the Berkeley Law faculty in 2009 he was Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University. Professor Quinn holds a Ph.D in Political Science from Washington University in St. Louis. He has written extensively on judicial decision making and statistical methodology.

March 1, 2013

In ordinary life we place special concern on what we do – that you read to your child, or that you honor your promise even when breaking it would add to the sum total of honored promises. Democratic citizens register a version of this agent-relative concern when they experience special horror at the injustices committed by their state. I argue that agent-relative reasons play no less significant a role in our thinking about distributive justice. Egalitarian theories should make essential back-reference to democratic citizens and, by their authorization, elected officials. Egalitarianism isn’t fundamentally a specification sheet of what distributive patterns should occur, but a system of time cards that describe the work we must carry out in our official role as citizens. This explains the non-fungible character of our distributive obligations – they cannot be handed off to non-official agents or institutions, however reliable or diligent. My approach builds on relational egalitarianism, bearing more directly on policy debates about the limits of private philanthropy, the permissibility of structural unemployment, and the stringency of the social safety net.

March 1, 2013

What explains patterns of compliance with and resistance to autocratic rule? I argue that the types of non-compliance observed in autocracies differ across societal groups as a function of the prevailing punishment regime applied to group members. When gathering information about opposition is costly, autocrats punish transgressions collectively, leading groups to cohere in a way that encourages cascades into rebellion. When the cost of gathering information about anti-regime behavior within the group is low, autocrats punish narrowly but levels of within-group cohesion are also low, encouraging individual acts of non-compliance. This framework is associated with a number of empirical regularities observed in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Students living in predominantly Sunni areas - which shared a sectarian identification with the regime leadership and were, thus, highly legible to the regime - were less likely to join the Ba`th Party than their counterparts living in the Shi`a south. Southern areas populated by Shi`a Iraqs were more likely, however, to witness private forms of non-compliance, like the circulation of destabilizing rumors. Kurdish areas of the Iraqi north maintained an almost continuous state of insurgency since severe norms of collective punishment against Kurdish populations encouraged strong social networks and an “all-in" strategy of armed resistance

February 27, 2013

Barry R. Weingast is the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor, Department of Political Science, and a Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution. He served as Chair, Department of Political Science, from 1996 through 2001. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and has been a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1996.  Weingast’s research focuses on the political foundation of markets, economic reform, and regulation. He has written extensively on problems of political economy of development, federalism and decentralization, legal institutions and the rule of law, and democracy. Weingast is co-author of Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (with Douglass C.

February 22, 2013

Equality of opportunity in education is interpreted in different ways. For some it means that each child should be legally permitted to go to school. For others it requires that each child receives the same educational resources. Further interpretations abound. This fact presents a problem: when politicians or academics claim they are in favour of equality of opportunity in education it is unclear what they mean and debate is hindered by mutual misunderstanding.

In this paper I introduce a framework to ameliorate this problem. More specifically, I develop an important but neglected framework for the concept of equality of opportunity and apply it to examine particular conceptions of equality of opportunity in education. In doing this I produce a piece of applied conceptual analysis that can both help clarify existing positions within the equality of opportunity in education debate and allow those seeking to produce new positions to express them more clearly.

February 22, 2013

What explains cross-national variation in energy policy?  Although energy efficiency is widely acknowledged as a central element of energy security and international efforts to mitigate climate change, the domestic politics of energy efficiency are not well understood.  I argue that variation in energy efficiency can be explained by electoral incentives.  Energy efficiency is more feasible under electoral arrangements, such as non-majoritarian systems, that allow for the imposition of high, diffuse costs on the general public.  This remedies an important roadblock to efficiency in democratic states – public opposition to high energy prices and taxes, particularly in the transportation sector.  Ironically, although non-majoritarian electoral systems are generally viewed as poor generators of domestic public goods, their ability to impose diffuse costs makes them effective at the provision of global public goods.  I test this theory both qualitatively and quantitatively.  First, using a new dataset of transportation trends in fourteen OECD countries, I demonstrate the relationship between energy efficiency and electoral incentives across a range of model specifications and dependent variables.  Second, I conduct an in-depth examination of the impact of electoral reform in Japan in 1994 on transportation sector efficiency policy. 

February 15, 2013

Philosophers often remark that many of our interpersonal relationships are valuable for their own sake.  However, even the most intimate of these relationships —friendships, family ties and spiritual kinships— inevitably have instrumental value.  Relationships provide stocks of goods that individuals can draw from to achieve a variety of ends. Some of these goods, such as emotional support, trust and influence, count as ‘relationship goods’—they either distinctively exist within interpersonal relationships or are themselves constitutive of such relationships.  In this paper, I wish to defend the novel claim that relationship goods should be understood as appropriate objects of distribution (distribuenda), like income and wealth, and that the just redistribution of relational resources across society should be regarded as an imperative of distributive justice. By so arguing, my aim is not simply to add an extra category of goods to whatever existing list of distribuenda – an aim the importance of which would be limited. My objective is rather the much more ambitious one of showing that liberal theories of distributive justice have a direct, for inherently distributive, reason to care about how people relate to each other  -- something they have long been accused of neglecting, both by communitarian and relational egalitarian critics.

February 15, 2013

This paper explores the determinants of territorial conflicts among African states using a novel geospatial data set that maps disputed and undisputed borders. The geospatial approach helps eliminate problems of aggregation and selection on the dependent variable in studies of territorial conflict, as well as permitting fine-grained analysis of the local determinants of disputes. The data are used to test several hypotheses pertaining to the partitioning of ethnic groups, the presence of natural resources, natural vs. artificial borders, and state power. We find that border segments that partition ethnic groups are at higher risk of conflict only when the ethnic group is dominant, politically and demographically, within the state or has a high level of political centralization and that these effects are most pronounced early in the life of the state. The presence of oil or mineral deposits does not systematically increase the risk of a dispute, while river borders are less likely to be contested. The results suggest that territorial claims were, in large part, a tool for governments in newly-independent states to build support among politically important groups and to build ethnically-based national identities in relatively homogeneous states.

February 13, 2013

Michael Tomz is Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Center for International Development and at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Tomz has published in the fields of international relations, American politics, comparative politics, and statistical methods. He is the author of Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries and numerous articles in political science and economics journals.