Past Events

December 5, 2012

Gary W. Cox, Professor of Political Science. In addition to numerous articles in the areas of legislative and electoral politics, Cox is author of The Efficient Secret (winner of the 1983 Samuel H. Beer dissertation prize and the 2003 George H. Hallett Award), co-author of Legislative Leviathan (winner of the 1993 Richard F. Fenno Prize), author of Making Votes Count (winner of the 1998 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, the 1998 Luebbert Prize and the 2007 George H. Hallett Award); and co-author of Setting the Agenda (winner of the 2006 Leon D. Epstein Book Award).  A former Guggenheim Fellow, Cox was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1996 and the National Academy of Sciences in 2005. Ph.D.

November 30, 2012

Brian Coyne is a fifth year Political Science PhD candidate studying political theory. His dissertation, currently in progress, addresses how the liberal principle of legitimacy can be revised to take into account the involvement of non-state actors, such as NGOs and corporations, in governance around the world. His other research interests include public reason, global justice, and representation. He has been a graduate fellow at the Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society and served as a Teaching Assistant for Justice, Global Justice, the Ethics and Politics of Public Service, and Theories of Civil Society, Philanthropy, and the Non-Profit Sector.

November 30, 2012

Do minorities fare worse under direct democracy than under representative democracy? We provide new evidence by studying naturalization requests of immigrants in Switzerland, which were typically decided at the municipal level in citizen' assemblies. Using panel data from 1,400 municipalities for the 1990-2010 period, we exploit recent Federal court rulings that led most municipalities to transfer the naturalization decision to an elected municipality council. We show that naturalization rates surged by 50% once legislatures, rather than citizens in popular referenda, decided on local naturalization applications. 

November 16, 2012

Alex Voorhoeve is a Reader in Philosophy at the London School of Economics. His research interests include Political Philosophy, Rational and Social Choice Theory, Moral Philosophy.   He is currently pursuing two research projects: Liberal Egalitarianism and The Economy of the Soul. 

November 16, 2012

Abstract: In this paper, I propose a theory of endogenous protection under authoritarianism, which argues that the structure of protection, both across industries and over time, reflects not only the distribution of winners and losers from free trade and the cost of lobbying but also, more importantly, different groups’ access to trade policymakers. 

November 15, 2012

Edward Miguel is the Oxfam Professor in Environmental and Resource Economics and Faculty Director of the Center for Effective Global Action at the University of California, Berkeley, where he has taught since 2000.

He earned S.B. degrees in both Economics and Mathematics from MIT, and received a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, where he was a National Science Foundation Fellow.

Ted's main research focus is African economic development, including work on the economic causes and consequences of violence; the impact of ethnic divisions on local collective action; and interactions between health, education, environment, and productivity for the poor. He has conducted field work in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and India.

November 14, 2012

Gabriel Lenz is an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He has a forthcoming book with the University of Chicago Press and his articles appear in the American Journal of Political Science, Political Behavior, and Political Psychology. Professor Lenz studies democratic politics, focusing on what leads citizens to make good political decisions, what leads them to make poor decisions, and how to improve their choices.

November 9, 2012

Abstract: The need for further exploration of the economic injustice of unemployment should be obvious.  Unemployment is currently at historically high rates and these high rates may be becoming structural.  Aside from inequality, unemployment is accordingly the problem that is most likely to put critical pressure on our political institutions, disrupt the social fabric of our way of life, and even threaten the continuation of liberalism itself.  Despite the obvious importance of the problem of unemployment, however, there has been a curious lack of attention paid to this issue by contemporary non-Marxist political philosophers.  Non-Marxists typically view unemployment as a technical matter, and doing something about it a question of means not ends, with the solution to this question depending on the kind of empirical determinations about what causes what that are best left to economists, not political philosophers.  But I think this is a mistake.  Because work is a major part of our social life, as well as something that for a great many people grounds their sense of who they are and provides the basis of their sense of self-respect, those unable to find work are missing out on a great deal of what makes for a meaningful life, and not just the economic benefits that social cooperation has to offer.  Those who are unemployed accordingly have something to complain about, even if we do not let them starve, and the rest of us (or at least the institutions that represent us) may have some sort of moral obligation to take action to increase the number of employment opportunities currently available regardless of any uncertainty surrounding the effects that any actions open to us might have.  The nature and extent of this moral obligation is what this paper is dedicated to exploring.

November 9, 2012

Abstract: After rising to prominence in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) has enjoyed a string of electoral victories that has dramatically reversed a long history of electoral volatility in Turkey. Economic voting cannot account for the rise and consistent success of this Islamic-based party at the polls; neither is there evidence of a rise in religiosity among Turkish voters. To account for the AKP’s consistent success, I suggest that vote volatility results not just from conscious party-switching, but also from the failure of voters to coordinate, and that distrust among voters is a significant source of coordination failure and electoral instability. Where generalized distrust is high, as it is in Turkey, feelings of trust among individuals with a strong religious identity, signaled and strengthened through their participation in collective religious activities, creates a comparative advantage for Islamist parties at the polls, particularly in the most distrusting, volatile districts in which other voters fail to coordinate. I find support for my theory using panel data from across Turkey’s 81 provinces as well cross-nationally, using a new dataset of vote volatility in 84 democratic regimes.

November 2, 2012

Jeffrey Stout is professor of religion at Princeton University. He is a member of the Department of Religion, and is associated with the departments of Philosophy and Politics and with the Center for the Study of Religion and the Center for Human Values.  He joined the Princeton faculty in 1975.  This year he is director of graduate studies in Religion.