

VITA

BARRY R. WEINGAST

September 2006

PERSONAL

Date and place of Birth: September 1, 1952, Los Angeles, California.

Home Address: 2 Wildwood Lane
Menlo Park, CA 94025
Telephone: (650) 854-8069

Office Address: Hoover Institution
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
Telephone: (650) 723-3729 (messages)
Fax: (650) 723-1687
Department of Political Science
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-2044

Email: weingast@stanford.edu

Citizenship: U.S.A.
Marital Status: Married (Susie Cohen),
one child (Samuel Robert)

ACADEMIC BACKGROUND

B.A. (Mathematics), University of California, Santa Cruz, June 1973.
Ph.D. (Economics), California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, June 1978.
Thesis Title: "A Representative Legislature and Regulatory Agency Capture."

PRINCIPAL PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, and Research Associate, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, St. Louis, 1977-1983.

Associate Professor, Department of Economics; Associate Professor of Economics and Political Economy, School of Business; and Research Associate, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1983-1986.

Professor of Economics and Political Economy, School of Business; and Research Associate, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1986-1988.

Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September 1987-August 1990.

Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September 1990-present.

Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, September 1992-February 1997.

Ward C. Krebs Family Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, February 1997-present.

Chair, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, September 1996-August 2001.

OTHER PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, April 1986-August 1987.

Visiting Professor of Economics and Political Economy, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Spring 1987.

Professor (by courtesy) of Economics, Stanford University, September 1989-present.

Visiting Professor, School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Spring 1990.

Lecturer, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, September 1990-August 1992.

Associate Director, Program on Public Policy, Stanford University, September 1990-August 1993; September 1995-August 1996.

Senior Research Fellow, Institute on Policy Reform, Washington, DC, April 1992-July 1996.

Vice-Chair, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, September 1995-August 1996.

University Advisory Board, September 2002- August 2003.

Senior Fellow (by courtesy), Stanford Center for International Development, January 2004-present.

Senior Fellow (by courtesy), Stanford Institute for International Studies, January 2004-present.

Member, Policy and Planning Advisory Committee, School of Humanities and Sciences, September 2005-present.

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

Political Economy, the New Economics of Organization and Institutions, Regulation, and Rational Choice Interpretation of Legal, Legislative, and Constitutional Institutions.

Applications include American Politics, European integration, and the historical and contemporary development of democratic and market institutions.

HONORS, AWARDS, AND GRANTS

National Science Foundation Grant to study, "The Two Arenas: Institutional Policymaking and the Political Transformation of Economic Incidences" (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), September 1981-August 1983.

James L. Barr Memorial Award for the best paper of the year in Public Economics, 1981.

Duncan Black Prize for the best paper of the year in **Public Choice**, 1981 (with Kenneth A. Shepsle).

National Endowment for the Humanities Grant, Law and Liberty Program, Washington University (for curricular development in law and economics, Econ 250: "The Political and Economic Consequences of Constitutional Constraints on Legislatures"), 1982.

National Science Foundation Grant to study, "A Theory of Legislative Institutions" (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), September 1983-August 1986.

Grants provided by the Bradley Foundation, the Scaife Foundation, and the Smith-Richardson Foundation to organize and publish the proceedings of a "Conference on Political Economy and Business," Olin School of Business, Washington University (March 19-21, 1987).

Heinz Eulau Award for the best paper of the year in the **American Political Science Review**, 1987 (with Kenneth A. Shepsle).

National Science Foundation Grant to study "Rational Foundations of Political Institutions," March 1987-February 1990.

IRIS Grant to study, "Institutional Reform and the Political Commitment to Sustain Markets," January 1992-January 1993.

Smith Richardson Grant to study, "The Emerging Battle of the Regulatory State: Congress, the Conservative Supreme Court, and Civil Rights," July 1992-June 1993.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA, 1993-1994.

Mary Parker Follett Prize for the best paper in politics and history published in 1994 (with Charles Stewart).

Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha Award for the best paper presented at the 1994 American Political Science Association Meeting (with Kenneth Schultz).

John M. Olin Visiting Scholar, Cornell Law School (May and October 1996).

Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1996-present.

Mary Parker Follett Prize for the best paper in politics and history published in 1998.

Sage Award for best paper in the area of comparative politics presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, 2000.

Distinguished Scholar Award in Public Policy, Martin School of Public Policy, University of Kentucky, 2001.

John M. Olin Visiting Scholar, Virginia Law School (April 2002).

William H. Riker Prize and Lecture, 2006.

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND SERVICE

Member: American Economic Association
American Political Science Association
Economic History Association
Midwest Political Science Association
Public Choice Society

Trustee: American Political Science Association, 1983-86

Member, Board of Editors:

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Journal of Policy Reform

Public Choice

Business and Politics

Cambridge University Press series, *The Political Economy of Institutions*.

Cambridge University Press series, *Theories of Institutional Design*.

Advisory Board, Social Science History Institute, Stanford University, 1997-present.

Director, International Society for New Institutional Economics, 1998-2001.

Director, Public Choice Workshop (with Kenneth Shepsle), Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1978-86.

Director, Collective Choice Workshop (with John Ferejohn), Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1987-present.

American Political Science Association, Program Committee, 1987, 1995.

Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, September 1994-August 1996.

Organizer, Conference on "Political Economy and Business," Washington University School of Business, March 15-17, 1987.

Organizer (with John Ferejohn), Conference on "Legislative Behavior, Practices, and Institutions," Hoover Institution, Stanford University, February 25-27, 1988.

Organizer, Conference on "Institutional and Behavioral Change in the Post-Reform Congress," Hoover Institution, Stanford University, March 9-11, 1989.

Organizer (with Avner Greif and Susanne Lohmann), Conference on "Commitment in Economics, Politics, and History," Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, Stanford University, March 13-14, 1992.

Organizer (with Stephen Haber and William Summerhill), Conference on "Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America," Social Science History Institute, Stanford University, April 14-15, 2000.

Organizer (with Stephen Haber and Douglass North), Conference on "Political Liberty and Economic Development," Social Science History Institute, Stanford University, February 7-8, 2003.

Organizer (with Stephen Haber and Douglass North), Conference on "Economics, Political Institutions, and Financial Markets II: Institutional Theory and Evidence from Europe, the United States, and Latin America," Social Science History Institute, Stanford University, February 4-5, 2005.

BOOKS AND EDITED VOLUMES

Symposium on: The Law and Economics of Constitutions and Public Law, (editor, with Robert Cooter), special issue of *International Review of Law and Economics* 12 (June, 1992).

Formal Models of Legislatures (editor, with Kenneth A. Shepsle), special issue of *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19 (May 1994).

Reprinted as *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions* (edited, with Kenneth A. Shepsle). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 1995.

The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted? (editor, with John A. Ferejohn). Stanford: Hoover Institution Press (1997).

Analytic Narratives (with Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Review essay, Jon Elster's "Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition," *American Political Science Review* (September 2000) 94:685-95. Response: "The Analytic Narrative Project" (with Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal). *American Political Science Review* (September 2000) 94:696-702.

Translated into Chinese (China Remnin University Press, forthcoming February 2007).

Self-Enforcing Institutions (a collection of my essays) Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

Institutions and Political Commitment: A New Political Economy of the American Civil War Era. Unpublished book manuscript, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2000.

Symposium on: Institutions, Economics, and the Ancient Mediterranean World (editor, with Ian Morris), *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* Vol 160, No 4. (2004): 702-85.

The Politics of Financial Development (editor, with Stephen Haber and Douglass C. North) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming, 2007).

Preferences and Situations: Points of Contact between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalisms (editor, with Ira Katznelson). (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005.)

Handbook Political Economy (editor, with Donald Wittman) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

PUBLICATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS

"A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms," **American Journal of Political Science** 24 (1979), pp. 245-262.

Reprinted in **Congress: Structure and Policy**, ed. by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Ch. 4. Reprinted in Philip Norton, ed., **Legislatures and Legislators**. (Gower House, England: Ashgate Publishing, 1998.)

"Congress, Regulation, and the Decline of Nuclear Power," **Public Policy** 28 (1980), pp. 231-55.

"Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice," (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). **Public Choice** 37 (1981), pp. 503-19.

Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., **Public Choice Theory**. Vol. II. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993); reprinted in Claude Menard, ed., **The International Library of the New Institutional Economics**. vol 1. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004)

"Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization," (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). **American Journal of Political Science** 26 (February 1981), pp. 86-111.

"The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," (with Kenneth A. Shepsle and Christopher Johnsen). **Journal of Political Economy** 89 (August 1981), pp. 642-664.

Reprinted in Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, eds., **Monetary and Fiscal Policy**. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1994).

"Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency-Clientele Relationships," **Law and Contemporary Problems** 44 (Winter 1981), pp. 147-177.

Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., **Public Choice Theory**. Vol. III. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993).

"Congress as the Source of Regulatory Decisions: The Case of the Federal Trade Commission," (with Mark J. Moran). **American Economic Review** 72 (May 1982), pp. 109-113.

"Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications," (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). **American Economic Review** 72 (May 1982), pp. 367-71.

"Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the FTC" (with Mark J. Moran). **Journal of Political Economy** 91 (October 1983), pp. 765-800.

Reprinted in: Robert Mackay, James C. Miller, and Bruce Yandle (eds.), **Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission**. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987), Ch. 3. Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., **Public Choice Theory**. Vol. III. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993). Reprinted in Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., **The Foundations of Regulatory Economics**. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999). Reprinted in part in: Walter Gellhorn, **Administrative Law** 8th ed. (West Publishing Co.); Gellhorn and Byse, **Administrative Law** 9th ed. (Foundation Press); reprinted in Thomas P. Lyon, **Regulation** (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming, 2007).

Comment by Timothy J. Muris, "Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control." **Journal of Political Economy** 94 (1986): pp. 884-89. Reply, "Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice," **Journal of Political Economy** 94 (1986), pp. 890-4.

"Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions" (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). **American Journal of Political Science** 29 (February 1984), pp. 49-74.

"When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?" (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). **Journal of Politics** 46 (February 1984), pp. 206-221.

"Political Solutions to Market Problems," (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). **American Political Science Review** 78 (June 1984), pp. 417-34.

Reprinted in Andrew Levine (ed.) **The State and Its Critics** (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1992), ch. 17.

"The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective (with applications to the SEC)," in "Carnegie Papers on Political Economy," edited by Alan Meltzer, Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal, special supplement to **Public Choice** 44 (1984), pp. 147-91.

- "The Institutional Foundations Of Committee Power," (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). **American Political Science Review** 81 (March 1987), pp. 85-194.
 Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., **Public Choice Theory**. Vol. II. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1993); reprinted in Philip Norton, ed., **Legislature and Legislators**. (Ashgate Publishing, 1998)
 Comment by Keith Krehiel, "Controversies," **American Political Science Review** 81 (September 1987), pp 929-35. Reply: "Reflections on Committee Power" (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), "Controversies," **American Political Science Review** 81 (September 1987), pp. 935-45.
- "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control" (with Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger G. Noll), **Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization** 3 (Fall 1987): 243-77.
 Reprinted in part in Arthur Earl Bonfield and Michael Asimow, **Federal and State Administrative Law** (West Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 16-18 and 531-35; reprinted in Paul L. Joskow, ed., **Economic Regulation**. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2000); and reprinted in Cary Conglianese and Robert Kagan, eds., **Regulation and Regulatory Processes** (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, forthcoming).
- "Constitutional Regulation of Legislatures: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference" (with William H. Riker), **Virginia Law Review** 74 (March 1988): 373-401.
 Reprinted in Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, eds., **Constitution, Democracy, and State Power: The Institutions of Justice**. Vol. I. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1997).
- "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Market" (with William J. Marshall), **Journal of Political Economy** 96 (February 1988): 132-63.
 Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., **Public Choice Theory**. Vol II. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1993). Reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Scott E. Masten, **Transaction Cost Economics**. vol. I. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1995). Reprinted in Dennis C. Mueller, **The Economics of Politics**. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2001). Reprinted in Claude Menard, **The International Library of the New Institutional Economics** vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004).
 Translated into Spanish in Sebastian M. Saiegh and Mariano Tommasi, eds. **La Nueva Economia Politica: Racionalidad e Instituciones**. Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1998; translated into Chinese: **Collection of Transactions Cost Politics** (Chinese RenMin University Press, forthcoming).
- "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies" (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), **Virginia Law Review** 75 (March 1989): 431-82.
 Reprinted in Thomas P. Lyon, ed., **Regulation**. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming, Spring 2007.)
- "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887" (with Thomas W. Gilligan and William J. Marshall), **Journal of Law and Economics** 32 (April 1989): 35-61.
- "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion," (with Randall L. Calvert and Mathew D. McCubbins). **American Journal of Political Science** (August 1989) 83: 588-611.

"Floor Behavior in Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule," **American Political Science Review** (September 1989) 83: 795-815.

"Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England" (with Douglass C. North). **Journal of Economic History**. (December 1989) 49: 803-32.

Reprinted in: Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, eds., **Monetary and Fiscal Policy**. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1994); reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Scott E. Masten, eds., **Transaction Cost Economics**. vol. I. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995); reprinted in Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, eds., **Empirical Studies in Institutional Change** (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); reprinted in Svetozar Pejovich, ed., **The Economics of Property Rights**. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001); reprinted in Colin D. Scott, ed., **Regulation** (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2003). Reprinted in Claude Menard, **The Political Economy of Institutions** vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004).

Reprinted with a new introduction, "Limited Government and Liberal Markets: An Introduction to "Constitutions and Commitment," in Paul W. Drake and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., **The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

Comment by Bruce G. Carruthers, "Politics, Popery and Property: A Comment on North and Weingast," **Journal of Economic History** (Sept. 1990) 50: 693-98.

"The Political Institutions of Representative Government: Legislatures." **Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics** (December, 1989) 145: 693-703.

Reprinted in Eric Furubotn and Rudolph Richter (eds.), **The New Institutional Economics**. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]; and College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1991).

"The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: The Economic and Political Consequences of the Shorthaul Pricing Constraint" (with Thomas W. Gilligan and William J. Marshall). **Rand Journal of Economics** 11 (Summer 1990): 189-210.

"The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs" (with Paul R. Milgrom and Douglass C. North) **Economics and Politics** (March 1990) 2: 1-23.

Reprinted in Douglas Irwin, ed., **Trade in the Pre-Modern Period: 1400-1700**. (Edward Elgar, 1996); reprinted in Daniel Klein, ed., **Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct**. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1997); reprinted in Claude Menard, **The Political Economy of Institutions** vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004); reprinted in Lisa Martin, **International Institutions in the New Global Economy** (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005); reprinted in Edward Stringham, **Anarchy and the Law** (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, forthcoming 2006); and reprinted in Eric A. Posner, **Social Norms, Nonlegal Sanctions, and the Law** (Edward Elgar Publishing, Spring 2007, forthcoming).

"Positive and Normative Models of Due Process: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures," Published under "McNollgast" (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll) **Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization** (1990) 6: 307-32.

- "The Political Control of Bureaucracies Under Asymmetric Information" (with Jeffrey Banks). **American Journal of Political Science** (1992) 36: 509-24.
- "Limitations of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation," (with John A. Ferejohn), **Georgetown Law Review** (1992) 80: 565-82.
- "Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation," Published under "McNollgast" (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), **Georgetown Law Review** (1992) 80: 705-42.
Reprinted in Singer, Norman J., ed., **Sutherland Statutory Construction**. 5th ed. (Deerfield, Illinois: Clark-Boardman-Callaghan. 1992) Volume 3A, pp. 739-762. Reprinted in Singer, Norman J., ed., **Sutherland on Contracts and Statutory Construction**. 6th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000). Reprinted in **Sutherland on Contracts and Statutory Construction**. 7th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, forthcoming).
- "Stacking the Senate, Changing the Nation: Republican Rotten Boroughs and American Political Development in the Late 19th Century" (with Charles Stewart III), **Studies in American Political Development** (1992) 6: 223-71.
- "Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets," **Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics**. (1993) 149: 286-311.
Reprinted in Stefan Voight, ed., **Constitutional Political Economy** (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.) Reprinted in Claude Menard, **The Political Economy of Institutions** vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004).
Comment by Peter Bernholz, **Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics**. (1993) 149: 312-20.
- "Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation," Published under "McNollgast" (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), **Law and Contemporary Problems** (1994) 57: 3-37.
Reprinted in Daniel A. Farber, ed., **Public Choice and Public Law**. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
- "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions" (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), **Legislative Studies Quarterly** (May, 1994) 19: 149-79.
Reprinted in Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. **Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions** University of Michigan Press. 1995.
- "Commitment, Coordination, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guilds" (with Avner Greif and Paul Milgrom). **Journal of Political Economy** (1994) 102: 745-76.
Reprinted in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds. **Explaining Social Institutions**. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1995); reprinted in Elias L Khalil, ed., **Trust** (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003); reprinted in Claude Menard, **The International Library of the New Institutional Economics** vol 3. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004); and reprinted in Eric A. Posner, **Social Norms, Nonlegal Sanctions, and the Law** (Edward Elgar Publishing, Spring 2007, forthcoming).

- "Reflections on Distributive Politics and Universalism," **Political Research Quarterly** (June 1994) 47: 319-28.
- "Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law," Published under "McNollgast" (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), **Southern California Law Journal** (September 1995) 68: 1631-83.
- "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development." **Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization** (Spring 1995) 11: 1-31.
Reprinted in Peter J. Boettke, ed., **The Legacy of Friedrich von Hayek** (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming); in Stefan Voight, **Constitutional Political Economy** (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004); in Claude Menard, **The International Library of the New Institutional Economics** (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2005); and in Nicholas Mercuro, ed., **Critical Concepts in Law; Major Work: Law and Economics** (Routledge Publishing, forthcoming, 2007).
- "A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation," **Politics and Society** (December, 1995) 23: 449-64.
- "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China" (with Gabriella Montinola and Yingyi Qian), **World Politics** (October, 1995) 48: 50-81.
Reprinted in Chun Lin, ed., **China**. Vol. II (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000).
- "China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style" (with Yingyi Qian). **Journal of Policy Reform**. (1996) 1: 149-86.
Translated into Chinese, **Economic Highlights** (serialized, beginning August 18, 1995).
- "A Comparative Theory of Federalism: The Case of India" (with Sunita Parikh) **Virginia Law Review** (October 1997) 83: 1593-1615.
- "The Origins of American Trade Policy: Rules, Coalitions and International Politics," (with Michael Bailey and Judith Goldstein) **World Politics** (April 1997) 49: 309-38.

- "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." **American Political Science Review** (June 1997) 91: 245-63.
- "A Postscript to 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,'" in Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds., **Introduction to Democracy and the Rule of Law**. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives" (with Yingyi Qian), **Journal of Economic Perspectives** (Fall 1997) 11: 83-92.
- "From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style" (with Yuanzheng Cao and Yingyi Qian) **Economics of Transition** (1999) vol 7 no. 1: 103-31.
- Excerpted in part, "The Sale Goes On — Transforming Small Enterprises in China," **Transition** (February 1998) 9: 5-7.
- "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition," (with Robert Bates and Rui de Figueiredo). **Politics and Society** (December 1998). 26: 603-42.
- "The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act," Published under "McNollgast" (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll) **Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization** (April 1999) 15: 180-217.
- "Analytic Narratives Revisited," (with Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal) **Social Science History** (Winter 2000) 24, 4: 679-690.
- "The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB" (with Susan K. Snyder). **Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization** (November 2000) 16: 269-305.
- "The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition" (with Kenneth A. Schultz). **International Organization** (Winter, 2003) 57: 3-42.
- "The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation (with Daniel Rodriguez). **University of Pennsylvania Law Review** (April, 2003) 151(4): 1417-1542.
- "Self-Enforcing Federalism," (with Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr.). **Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization**. (April, 2005) 21: 103-35.
- "Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style," (with Hehui Jin and Yingyi Qian) **Journal of Public Economics** 89 (2005): 1719-42.
- Reprinted: **The Economics of Transition: The Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics**, edited by Erik Berglöf and Gérard Roland. (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2006).
- "The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty" **Journal of Economic Perspectives** 19(3) (2005): 89-108.

- “Conditions for Judicial Independence” Published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll) **Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues** (forthcoming, 2006).
- “The Paradox of Expansionist Judicial Statutory Interpretations” (with Daniel B. Rodriguez) **Northwestern University Law Review** 101 (forthcoming, Fall 2006).
- “Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-Confirming Equilibrium: A New Understanding of the American Revolution” (with Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Jack Rakove) **Journal of Theoretical Politics** (forthcoming).
- “Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia (with Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Michael McFaul) **Publius** (2007, forthcoming).
- “Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates” (with Dara Kay Cohen and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar) **Stanford Law Review** 59 (forthcoming, 2007).

PUBLICATIONS IN CONFERENCE VOLUMES AND EDITED COLLECTIONS

- "Safety Regulation," (with Nina W. Cornell and Roger G. Noll), in Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze (eds.), **Setting National Priorities: The Coming Decade** (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976).
- "Physicians, DNA Research Scientists, and the Market for Lemons," in **Regulating the Professions: A Policy Symposium**, edited by Roger D. Blair and Steven Rubin (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1980).
- "Congress, Regulation and the Courts: Economic Perspectives on Political Choice" (with Kent Hall), in **The Problems of Regulation: An Agenda for Research in the 1980s**, edited by Allen Ferguson (Ballinger, 1981).
- "Runaway Bureaucracy and Congressional Oversight: Why Reforms Fail," (with Randall L. Calvert). **Policy Studies Review** 1 (1982), pp. 557-64.
- "Policy Consequences of Government by Subcommittee," (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), in Lowell HARRISS (ed.), **Control of Federal Spending** (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1985), pp. 114-131.
- "Legislative Politics and Budgetary Outcomes," (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), in Gregory B. Mills and John L. Palmer (eds.), **Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s** (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1984), pp. 343-57.
- "Congressional Influence over Policymaking: The Case of the FTC" (with Randall L. Calvert and Mark J. Moran), in Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (eds.), **Congress: Structure and Policy** (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Ch. 19.

- "Penultimate Power: Conference Committees and the Legislation Process" (with Kenneth A. Shepsle) in Morris P. Fiorina and David H. Rohde (eds.), **Home Style and Washington Work: Studies of Congressional Politics** (University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 199-217.
- "Congress: The Genesis of the Thrift Crisis" (with Thomas Romer), **Stanford Law and Policy Review** (Spring 1990) 2: 37-46.
- "Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy," Published under "McNollgast" (with Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger G. Noll), **Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization** (1990) 6: 203-212.
- "Rational Actor Theory, Social Norms, and Policy Implementation: Applications to Administrative Processes and Bureaucratic Culture" (with Roger G. Noll), in Kristen Monroe (ed.), **The Economic Approach to Politics** (New York: Harper and Row, 1991).
- "Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle," (with Thomas Romer), Ch. 6 in Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, eds., **Politics and Economics in the 1980s**, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Series (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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