Assurance and Self-Assurance under Power Imbalance
How could power imbalance lead to war? How could power imbalance allow for mutual optimism? I analyze these questions using a formal model of incomplete information, where two parties bargain over two periods. I argue that power imbalance causes war because the strong party wishes to crush its weaker opponent, obviating the need for future concessions. This dynamic also explains how the two countries could be mutually optimistic about their path to victory, under two-sided incomplete information on capabilities and resolve. The strong country hopes that its enemy lacks the capabilities to survive the initial battle. The weak country hopes that its enemy lacks the resolve to continue the fight. I illustrate this argument by reevaluating the dynamics of the Pacific War of 1941-1945.
Alexandre Debs is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science at Yale University, where he is also the Faculty Director of the Nuclear Security Program in International Security Studies at the Jackson School of Global Affairs.
Alexandre’s research focuses on the causes of war, nuclear proliferation, and democratization. His work has appeared or is forthcoming in top political science and international relations journals, such as the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organization, and International Security. He is the author of the book “Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation” (with Nuno Monteiro), published by Cambridge University Press in 2017.
Alexandre received a Ph.D. degree in Economics from M.I.T., an M.Phil. in Economic and Social History from the University of Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, and a B.Sc. in Economics and Mathematics from Universite de Montreal.