Elite Clubs and Political Office Holding

An extensive literature argues that social capital facilitates political participation. This paper contributes to the literature on the political consequences of social capital by studying the effect of elite club membership on political office holding. We argue that elite social clubs foster strong social connections that allow members to increase their centrality in elite networks. In contexts of widespread clientelism, politicians’ networks are a critical determinant of their ability to effectively engage in vote buying, electoral violence, and electoral fraud. We exploit the founding of the Buenos Aires Jockey Club—which became the most prominent elite club in Argentina—in 1882 to identify the causal effect of elite club membership on subsequent political office holding. Our data—collected from numerous historical sources—allows us to use a robust two-way fixed effects empirical strategy for identification. We find that Jockey Club membership substantially increases an individual's centrality in elite social networks and the probability of winning a legislative position. Ours is the first paper to provide individual-level, causally identified evidence that an individual's entry into an elite social club increases his propensity for political office holding.