Reason, Reasons and Reasoning: Three Faces of Public Justification

The working hypothesis of this paper is the following: public justification and its attendant ideas of pubic reason, public reasons, public discourse and deliberation, have replaced contract and consent as the locus of liberal democratic legitimacy.  While this hypothesis is relatively uncontroversial there is a great deal of disagreement about how we should understand and engage in public justification. In this paper I identify two different approaches to public justification. The first gives priority to a public process of reasoning together over identifying shared public reasons and so downplays the epistemic component of public justification in favor of an ethical component.  Here it is the way reasons are presented (for example dogmatically or not) or the ethical tone and import of reasons (for example, disrespectful or not) that becomes central. The second focuses on identifying a set or category of reasons that are acceptable to all involved. Here a certain type epistemic concern focused on the content of justification (for example religion reasons or reasons that appeal to comprehensive views) takes centre stage.  I conclude with some general observations about the pluses and minuses of these two approaches.  In general however, I am sympathetic to the process or ethical view and argue that the epistemic view or reasons-based view tends to sacrifice inclusiveness for determinate outcomes.